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NOTE
The Eighth Circuit Allows a Child Tax
Credit Exemption in Bankruptcy
Proceedings: A Minty Fresh Start or Abuse
of the System?
Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015).

REBEKAH KELLER*

I. INTRODUCTION
Between 2014 and 2015, bankruptcy filings across the country decreased over ten percent.1 In the Eighth Circuit, bankruptcy filing rates have
dropped from 57,746 in 2014 to 51,301 in 2015.2 The decrease in filings in
the Eighth Circuit is telling when compared to the filing statistics from 2008
and 2009 in the same circuit: in 2008, bankruptcy filings in the Eighth Circuit
reached 73,677, and in 2009, filings reached 90,539.3 During the height of
the economic downturn in the United States, bankruptcy filings nationwide
increased almost thirty-two percent from 2008 to 2009.4 Even though filings
rates are slowly decreasing across the nation, American citizens are still feeling the effects of the economic crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2009.
While there are numerous reasons debtors file for bankruptcy, the market
crash in 2008 and the subsequent economic downturn can be attributed to
many individuals’ financial problems.
*

B.A., Macalester College, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2017. Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017. I would
like to offer a sincere thank you to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for her constant
support and guidance throughout law school, particularly through the learning, writing, and editing process of this Note.
1. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Bankruptcy Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending—During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2014 and 2015, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f/bankruptcy-filings/2015/09/30 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2016) (bankruptcy filings have decreased nationally 10.7%).
2. Id. The data for 2014 bankruptcy filings was collected from October 1,
2013, through September 30, 2014. Id. Data for 2015 was collected from October 1,
2014, through September 30, 2015. Id.
3. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Bankruptcy Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending—During the 12-Month Periods Ending December 31, 2008 and 2009, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f/bankruptcy-filings/2009/12/31 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2016). This is an increase of 22.9% over one year. Id.
4. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10

562

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

With money problems still pervasive in American society, and bankruptcy filing rates still so high, there are few ways in which debtors can recover from such drastic economic situations. Bankruptcy protection is one of
the most common ways debtors facing insurmountable economic difficulties
can pull themselves out of debt. The bankruptcy code is designed to give a
fresh start to those in near financial ruin by ensuring they are unencumbered
by past debt. One way to accomplish this fresh start is by a discharge of
debts that are not paid in bankruptcy proceedings.5 Another way to achieve
this fresh start is through the exemption scheme.
Exemption schemes vary from state to state, but they generally allow
debtors to keep their assets to continue a socially acceptable standard of living.6 This Note addresses a common source of relief that most debtors take
advantage of when filing for bankruptcy: exemption statutes and its applicability to low-income debtors who qualify for “public assistance benefits” and
income-based tax credits. One exemption that commonly appears in federal
and state exemption schemes is the public assistance benefit.7 While commonly included in exemption statutes, public assistance benefits are not often
defined within these statutes; however, the most basic definition of a public
assistance benefit is a form of financial aid for the “needy.”8 The scope of
public assistance benefits has been a subject of scrutiny for years.9 Currently,
there is a hopeless split among bankruptcy courts across the country in determining whether the Child Tax Credit constitutes a public assistance benefit
or not. The Eighth Circuit is the first appellate court to take up this issue.
Part II of this Note examines the issues presented in the instant case,
Hardy v. Fink, in which the Eighth Circuit became the first circuit court to
include the Child Tax Credit as a “public assistance benefit” under the Missouri exemption statute in a bankruptcy proceeding. Part III explores the
5. This is not within scope of this Note, but see generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Lifestyles of the Not-so-Rich or Famous: the Role of Choice or Sacrifice in Bankruptcy, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 629 (1997).
6. Some argue these exemption schemes are overly generous and rather than
giving a fresh start, actually provide a head start to these debtors post-bankruptcy.
See Elijah M. Alper, Note, Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy: How BAPCPA May
Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (2007); Timothy D.
Moratzka, Fresh Start, Head Start, or Running Start: Bankruptcy Exemption Planning, 22-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (2003); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains
or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995).
7. 11 U.S.C. §522(d) (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-603(3) (West 2016); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-1001(g)(1) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8)(a)
(West 2016); MO ANN. STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a) (West 2016).
8. See Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 723 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013),
rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015).
9. Many debtors across the country put the question before the bankruptcy court
as to whether the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and the Adoption
Tax Credit constitute public assistance benefits for the purposes of bankruptcy exemption schemes. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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applicable laws, legislative history, and recent case law that addressed these
issues. Part IV explores the Hardy decision’s in-depth examination of the
legislative history surrounding the Child Tax Credit and the underlying purpose behind including public assistance benefits in both state and federal exemption schemes. Part V offers a framework for analyzing exemption
schemes across the country by examining the Missouri exemption scheme
and attempting to provide clarity in the current statute for debtors and courts
in the future.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Pepper Minthia Hardy, sole provider for a family of four,10 filed for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in October 2012.11 As part of her filing, she was required to complete an array of forms, each setting out her assets, debts, and
income.12 On her Schedule B,13 she indicated that she was expecting an income tax refund, part of which was to be from a Child Tax Credit (“CTC”).14
Ms. Hardy estimated that her total income tax refund would be $4950.15 In
her bankruptcy filing, she indicated that $4895 of her expected $4950 return16
was to be exempt from her bankruptcy estate.17
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri established that Ms. Hardy’s actual federal income tax refund was $6311.18 Of
this $6311 refund, $2000 was from a CTC19 that Ms. Hardy listed as exempt
from her Chapter 13 bankruptcy as a “public assistance benefit” under Missouri bankruptcy exemption laws.20 The trustee handling Ms. Hardy’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy objected to Ms. Hardy’s claim that a portion of her federal
income tax refund attributable to the CTC was exempt from the reach of her
10. Pepper Hardy claimed two dependent children under the age of seventeen
and a dependent brother on her 2012 taxes. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 442 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722, rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. A Schedule B document is a list debtors are required to make of all their
personal items and their value. Bankruptcy Forms, Schedule A/B: Property (individuals), U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/schedule-abproperty-individuals (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
14. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 442.
15. Id.
16. Ms. Hardy claimed $595 under the Missouri wild card exemption, $2300 as a
head of household exemption, and $2000 attributable to the Child Tax Credit as a
public assistance benefit. Id. at 441 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 513.430.1(3), .440,
.430.1(10)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
17. Id. at 442.
18. Id.
19. This credit is actually referred to as the Additional Child Tax Credit, which
will be addressed infra Part III.
20. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 442; § 513.430.1(10)(a).
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creditors.21 The bankruptcy court consolidated Ms. Hardy’s case with another Chapter 13 case raising the same issue.22
In the accompanying case, Larry and Tara Lovelace filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy in October 2012.23 On their Schedule B, Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace
indicated they would be receiving an income tax refund, part of which would
be attributable to a CTC.24 Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace claimed three dependent
children on their federal and state income tax returns.25 The bankruptcy court
established that Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace were to receive a federal tax refund of
$4391.26 Of their $4391 federal refund, $3000 of it was attributable to the
CTC.27 Like Ms. Hardy, Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace listed the CTC as exempt
from their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding as a public assistance benefit.28
The trustee for the Lovelaces’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy objected to the exemption of the CTC from their bankruptcy estate.29
In its memorandum opinion, the bankruptcy court sustained the trustees’
objections in both the Hardy and Lovelace cases to the exemption of a CTC
as a public assistance benefit.30 The court held that, based on the legislative
history of the CTC and Missouri’s bankruptcy exemption laws, the CTC was
not a valid public assistance benefit that could be exempted from bankruptcy
estates.31 The court then addressed multiple Missouri cases in which debtors
have attempted to persuade the bankruptcy court that the CTC was a public
assistance benefit.32 None of the debtors in the cited cases were successful in
doing so, and the court remained unconvinced in the cases at bar.33
Ms. Hardy then appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit.34 The Bankruptcy Appel21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 443.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 444.
Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 723–24 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013),
rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015). When appealing a decision from the federal
bankruptcy court, a petitioner can appeal to the federal district court or to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the district in which the debtor resides. Appeals, U.S.
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases/appeals. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is a panel of court of appeals judges and district court judges
who are considered to be specialists in bankruptcy law and hear bankruptcy court
appeals. Id. In order to take an appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, both parties must agree to the venue. Id.
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late Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order sustaining the trustee’s objection to the debtor’s claimed exemption.35 The sole issue on appeal was
Ms. Hardy’s claimed exemption of the $2000 CTC from her 2012 federal tax
return.36 Ms. Hardy argued that the CTC fit within the common meaning of a
public assistance benefit, which she argued was “quite plainly an assistance
that benefits the public.”37 The court stated that the statute, legislative history, and dictionary did not support Ms. Hardy’s proffered definition of a public assistance benefit.38 The court instead relied on a Merriam-Webster’s
dictionary that defined a public assistance benefit as: “government aid to
needy, aged, or disabled persons and to dependent children.”39 Under its
definition of a public assistance benefit, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held
that the CTC was not a public assistance benefit under Missouri law and,
therefore, could not be exempted from her bankruptcy estate.40
Ms. Hardy appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.41 The court, though still not
persuaded by Ms. Hardy’s proffered definition of a public assistance benefit
under Missouri law, ultimately ruled in Ms. Hardy’s favor.42 The court relied
on the legislative intent and history of the amendments to the CTC instead of
previous case law based on older versions of the CTC.43 This decision made
the Eighth Circuit the first circuit court to rule in a debtor’s favor regarding
the CTC exemption.44 The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court’s order
sustaining the trustee’s objection to the debtor’s exemptions.45 The court
held that the true legislative intent behind the CTC statute was to benefit lowincome families, which fit within Missouri’s public assistance benefit exemption statute, and the credit should be exempt from Ms. Hardy’s bankruptcy
estate.46

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legislative history of the United States Code is filled with attempts
to provide aid, support, and tax assistance to low-income or impoverished
citizens. These attempts are clearly established in the legislative history of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 726.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 725 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (11th
ed. 2012)).
40. Id. at 726.
41. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2015).
42. Id. at 1190–91.
43. See id.
44. Id.; In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R.
722 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189.
45. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1191.
46. Id.
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both the federal bankruptcy laws and the federal tax laws. Because both the
bankruptcy code and the tax code are integral to the decision in the instant
case, it is important to establish a basic understanding of how each statute
operates in this context and how the statutes affect individuals in Missouri.
This Part establishes a framework of the bankruptcy laws relevant to debtors’
exemption claims, paying particular attention to the differences between the
federal bankruptcy code’s exemption scheme and Missouri’s exemption statutes. Next, it analyzes the CTC in the tax code, focusing on the legislature’s
intent in enacting the law and tracing how it has evolved over time. Finally,
this Part discusses how lower courts have addressed the issue of whether the
CTC is included within the definition of public assistance benefits.

A. Bankruptcy and Exemption Statutes
Title XI of the United States Code sets forth the federal bankruptcy statutes.47 Title XI also designates the different types of bankruptcy filings
available.48 An individual debtor may file for bankruptcy under three different code chapters: Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13.49 Debtors’ first
duties under each filing option are to report all income, personal property,
and other assets in their bankruptcy petitions.50
As part of filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,51 debtors are also required
to propose a bankruptcy plan.52 The plan lays out all of the debtors’ assets
that are included in the bankruptcy estate,53 as well as any exemptions that
debtors may have to exclude from the estate.54 It then establishes all allowable deductions and formulates the remaining amount as disposable income.55
This disposable income then goes toward funding debtors’ bankruptcy plans,
which shows how much each creditor will be paid over a three or five year
period.56 In Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, debtors retain all their assets
– even those that are not exempted from the bankruptcy estate.57 The debt47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2016).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1101, 1301 (2012).
Id.
Id.
A debtor or debtor organization may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7
or Chapter 11; however, this Note focuses on the organization and structure of Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings only because that was the subject of the instant case.
52. 11 U.S.C.A § 1322. The plan is an organization of the debtor’s assets and
responsibilities. Id. This works to provide a strategy for repaying the debtor’s creditors during the bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
53. Id. The “bankruptcy estate” is the term used for the compilation of the debtor’s assets and incomes that are applied to the debtor’s debts in the plan. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 541. It is created by operation of law pursuant to I.R.C. § 541 (West 2016).
54. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012).
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ors’ estates are then assigned trustees who are in charge of obtaining a payment each month from the debtors and using those funds to pay creditors in
accordance with the plan.58
Generally, all property in debtors’ estates is available to pay creditors;
however, debtors can exempt certain portions of their property from their
bankruptcy estates.59 Section 522 of Title XI establishes allowable exemptions.60 In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, non-exempt property must be
turned over to the bankruptcy trustee.61 This property will be distributed and
sold to creditors.62 Under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, debtors are
required to pay at least as much to their unsecured creditors as they would
have received under a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding.63 Although debtors
keep all their property whether exempt or not in Chapter 13, exemptions are
very important in determining how much debtors must pay to creditors over
the life of the bankruptcy plan.64 Generally, debtors can choose either the
federal bankruptcy exemption scheme, set forth in Section 522(d) of the
bankruptcy code, or their state’s allowable exemptions, whichever is greater.65 However, states may “opt out” of the federal exemption scheme and
force debtors domiciled in that state to choose its own exemptions.66
Missouri has opted out of the Section 522 exemptions in favor of adopting its own exemption scheme that applies to all Missouri residents who file
for bankruptcy.67 Missouri’s exemptions statute is comprehensive68 and includes an exemption for debtors’ rights to receive “[a] Social Security benefit,
unemployment compensation or a public assistance benefit.”69 The term
“public assistance benefit” is not defined within the statute.70 In fact, until
58. Id. § 1302 (2013); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322. A debtor’s disposable income consists of the debtor’s income less allowed expenses for the six-month period preceding
the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West).
59. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522.
60. Id. Some common exemptions include: debtors’ interests in real estate-up to
a certain value; interest in a motor vehicle-up to a certain value; jewelry used primarily for personal or family reasons; and furniture, appliances, and clothing-up to a certain value. Id. § 522(d)(1)–(5).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 704.
62. Secured creditors are paid back before unsecured creditors. Id. § 502. Certain unsecured creditors have priority over other unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C.A. §
507.
63. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(4). This means that in order to establish how and
how much each of the creditors will be paid in a Chapter 13 proceeding, debtors’ plan
must determine how much each of the debtors’ unsecured creditors would have received if the debtors had filed under Chapter 7 instead. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 522.
66. Id. § 522(b).
67. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.427 (2000).
68. MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 513.430 (West 2016).
69. Id. § 513.430.1(10)(a).
70. Id.
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2012 the statute read “local public assistance benefit.”71 The removal of the
word “local” in 2012 expanded the scope of Missouri’s allowable exemptions.72 Bankruptcy courts have already determined that some federal tax
credits constitute public assistance benefits, such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit and the Adoption Tax Credit.73 Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts still
must look to Missouri’s exemption statutes to determine whether these federal tax credits are exemptible for Missouri debtors.

B. The Evolution of the Child Tax Credit
Congress adopted the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) as it exists today
in 1986 in a complete overhaul of the internal revenue laws in the United
States.74 In order to determine a taxpayer’s federal taxes each year, the Code
established a formula that starts with the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income75
and subtracts from it any deductions that the taxpayer might have to yield
taxable income.76 Once a taxpayer’s taxable income is determined, the tentative tax liability can be established.77
A taxpayer’s tax liability can then be reduced by credits against the tentative tax.78 There are three types of tax credits: nonrefundable, refundable,
and a combined non-refundable/refundable credit.79 Nonrefundable tax credits can be applied only to reduce outstanding tax liability80 to zero dollars;
any leftover nonrefundable tax credit disappears and cannot be returned to the
71. In re Corbett, No. 13–60042, 2013 WL 1344717, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
Apr. 2, 2013).
72. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015).
73. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See also In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 783
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2014); In re Johnson, 480 B.R. 305, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
74. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
75. Another example of a combined tax credit is the American Opportunity Tax
Credit. I.R.C. § 25A(i) (2015); REV. PROC. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, §3.05.
76. I.R.C. § 63 (West 2016).
77. Id. § 26(b)(1).
78. I.R.C. § 21 (2012). There are three ways to reduce tax liability: the first is
through “above the line deductions,” which are deductions taken from the taxpayer’s
taxable income before reaching adjusted gross income; the second set of deductions,
often referred to as below the line deductions, or, alternatively, as itemized deductions, are deducted after adjusted gross income, and result in taxable income. An
Overview of Tax Deductions, IRS, https://www.irs.com/articles/overview-taxdeductions (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). Taxable income is the taxpayer’s tax base.
See id. It is multiplied by progressive tax rates to establish tentative tax liability. Id.
Finally, credits are applied against a taxpayer’s tentative tax liability to yield the
amount owed to the government. Id. Credits are preferred over deductions because
they reduce tax liability dollar-for-dollar, whereas deductions reduce income before
applying progressive tax rates and are then worth less to the taxpayer. See id.
79. I.R.C. §§ 21, 31 (2012).
80. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015).
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taxpayer as a refund.81 With refundable credits on the other hand, a taxpayer
can receive a refund of any remaining tax credit once the taxpayer’s liability
is reduced to zero dollars.82 Credits that are a combination of nonrefundable
and refundable credits can directly reduce tax liability and provide a partial
cash refund once liability is reduced to zero dollars.83 The CTC is an example of a combined tax credit.84
Congress adopted the CTC in 1997.85 It was initially adopted as a
means to “reduce the individual income tax burden of [families with dependent children, to] better recognize the financial responsibilities of raising dependent children, and [to] promote family values.”86 The CTC established a
$500 credit per qualifying child for parents87 with three or more children
whose modified adjusted gross income fit within certain limits.88 The CTC
was originally codified as a nonrefundable credit.89 However, it has gone
through several substantial amendments since 1997, including the supplement
of the Additional Child Tax Credit (“ACTC”), the term for the inclusion of a
refundable portion of the CTC.90
In 2001, Congress increased the CTC from $500 per child to $600.91
The CTC also became available to all families, not just those with three or
more children.92 In addition, Congress created a refundable portion of the
CTC, the ACTC.93 This created a tax refund of ten percent of the taxpayer’s
earned income minus the refundability threshold, up to the maximum amount
available to the taxpayer per qualifying child.94

81. Id. (discussing the use of nonrefundable credits).
82. Id. at 443–44 (discussing the application of the refundable earned income tax

credit).
83. Id. (discussing the use of the CTC).
84. I.R.C. § 24 (West 2016); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation

Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §201, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47.
85. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L 105–34, § 101, 111 Stat. 788 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 24).
86. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015) (alteration
in original) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 310 (1997)).
87. Only taxpayers with families of three or more children under age seventeen
could qualify for the CTC originally. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 101.
88. I.R.C. §24(b)(1). The threshold income amounts are: $55,000 for married
filing separately; $75,000 for head of household; and $110,000 for married filing
jointly. Id. § 24(b)(2). This threshold is the point in a taxpayer’s income where the
credit begins to be scaled down-$50 for every $1000 above the threshold amount. Id.
89. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 101.
90. I.R.C. § 24(d).
91. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 201, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The refundability threshold was $10,000. Id.
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Then in 2003, Congress increased the CTC to $1000 per child, which
was extended in 2004.95 Additionally, Congress increased the refundable
ACTC from ten percent of earned income over $10,000 to fifteen percent.96
In 2008, Congress again amended the ACTC, reducing the refundability
threshold amount of earned income from $10,000 to $8500.97 This threshold
amount was again reduced in 2009 to $3000.98 These amendments “enabled
more low-income earners to claim a refund and increased the refund amount
for many low-income earners who previously were receiving a small refund.”99
The ACTC is easiest to understand through an example. Taxpayers are
a married couple who earned $25,000 in income and have four qualifying
children. Their CTC would be a maximum of $4000, $1000 per qualifying
child. In order to calculate the refundable portion, the tax code requires the
taxpayers to subtract from their earned income the refundability threshold of
$3000, which reduced their income for the credit to $22,000. Multiply this
income amount by the fifteen percent refundability percentage, which yields
$3300. Thus, $3300 of their available $4000 of CTC is refundable to the
taxpayers. So, if the taxpayers’ tax liability is $500, the remaining $700
available through the nonrefundable portion of the CTC can wipeout the taxpayers’ tax liability to $0. The remaining $200 of the credit is lost.

C. Recent Developments in the Lower Courts
Whether the CTC and ACTC fit within the scope of public assistance
benefits in bankruptcy has been debated in federal bankruptcy courts across
the country, and there remains a split of authority on the issue.100 In 2001, in
In re Steinmetz, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho ruled that
the CTC could not be exempted in bankruptcy as public assistance type aid,
95. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§ 101, 117 Stat. 752, 753; Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-311, §§ 101–02, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167–68.
96. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 §§ 101–02.
97. Emergency Economic Stabilization—Energy Improvement and Extension—
Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 501, 122
Stat. 3765, 3876 (2008).
98. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
1003, 123 Stat. 115, 313. In 2010, Congress extended this minimum threshold
through tax years 2011 and 2012. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 103, 124 Stat. 3296, 3299.
99. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 2015).
100. Compare In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 527–28 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003), In re
Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523, 526–28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014), and In re Hatch, 519 B.R.
783, 791–92 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2014), with In re Steinmetz, 261 B.R. 32, 35 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 2001), In re Dever, 250 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000), and In re
Jackson, No. 12-9635-RLM-7A, 2013 WL 3155595, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. June 20,
2013).
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finding that because the CTC contained a high-income threshold of $110,000,
Congress did not intend for the CTC to be “a form of public assistance legislation.”101
More recently, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Indiana ruled in In re Jackson that although the ACTC and the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) were both refundable credits, they served very
different purposes.102 The EITC is a refundable tax credit designed as an
antipoverty program.103 The EITC is available to low-income wage earners
and has been found by bankruptcy courts across the country to be a public
assistance benefit.104 The EITC was primarily enacted to provide economic
relief to low-income taxpayers while the ACTC was designed to aid a larger
portion of taxpayers with higher-earned income thresholds.105 Under these
circumstances, the court held that the EITC and the ACTC should not be
treated similarly in bankruptcy because they provide different functions for
taxpayers.106
On the other side of the split, in In re Koch the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Central District of Illinois found that it was possible to distinguish
between the general CTC, which is nonrefundable, and the ACTC, which is
refundable, for exemption purposes.107 Since the ACTC was added in 2001,
it has provided additional government aid for low-income taxpayers.108 The
court reasoned that “as structured, the additional child tax credit, refundable
to taxpayers of limited financial means and serving to meet the basic needs of
their dependent children, may be claimed exempt as a public assistance benefit.”109 The court in Koch concluded that the debtor was allowed to claim the
ACTC as exempt, but not the general CTC.110 Koch was decided only two
years after Steinmetz; however, as the court in Koch pointed out, the first major amendments to the CTC were adopted after In re Steinmetz was decided.111
101. In re Steinmetz, 261 B.R. at 35.
102. 2013 WL 3155595, at *2; I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
103. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44057, THE

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (2015).
104. Id. See also In re Hatch, 519 B.R. at 790; In re Corbett, No. 13–60042, 2013
WL 1344717, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. Mo., Apr. 2, 2013); In re Goldsberry, 142 B.R.
158, 159 (Bankr. E.D. Ky 1992) (“[E]arned income credit is a money grant to poor
working families with dependent children, that it therefore fits within the definition of
‘public assistance’ and is exempt under [KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §] 205.220(3).”).
105. In re Jackson, 2013 WL 3155595, at *2.
106. Id.
107. In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 527–28 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003).
108. Id. at 528.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 527–28.
111. Id. at 528. Since Koch, another court in Illinois reached a similar result in In
re Vazquez. 516 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). In 2014, the Vazquez court held
that because the ACTC was available only for low-income taxpayers as a refund, the
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the original bankruptcy court case, Ms. Hardy’s petition was consolidated with another Chapter 13 debtor’s case in order to determine the inclusion of the CTC as a public assistance benefit.112 In holding that the CTC
was not a public assistance benefit, the bankruptcy court relied on previous
bankruptcy court opinions in finding that the legislative intent behind the
CTC did not fit within the definition of a public assistance benefit.113 On
appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision, again relying on past case law examining the
legislative intent of the CTC as enacted in 1997.114 Ms. Hardy appealed the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s judgment to the Eighth Circuit.115
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the issue before the court was “whether
a portion of a tax refund based on the ACTC is exempt from the bankruptcy
estate as a public assistance benefit under Missouri law.”116 In framing the
holding, the court first addressed the Missouri exemption statute, Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 513.430.1(10)(a), and sought to establish a definition for a public assistance benefit under Missouri law.117 Because the exemption statute provided no definition for a public assistance benefit, the
court sought out the intent of the legislature through the term’s plain meaning.118 Ultimately, the court agreed with the definition set out by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel below, stating, “‘public assistance benefits’ are those
government benefits provided to the needy.”119
The court then analyzed whether the ACTC fits within this definition of
“public assistance benefits.”120 In order to make this determination, the court
looked to the intent of the legislature, the history of the statute, and the “operation of the statute in practice.”121 In finding that the ACTC fit within the
public assistance benefit exemption, the court explained its rationale based on

analysis in Koch remained valid. Id. at 527. The court in Vazquez compared the
analysis of Koch with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in Hardy and opined
that it was not the court’s responsibility to “decide the parameters and limits of exemptions or other forms of government assistance unless a legislative body delegates
that authority to it.” Id. at 526; see supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
112. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015).
113. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
115. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1192.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1193.
119. Id. (citing Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 725 (8th Cir. B.A.P.
2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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the amendments to the ACTC since its creation in 1997.122 The court examined the initial intent behind the CTC: to reduce the tax burden of families
and to promote family values.123 Since its enactment, however, the CTC has
undergone substantial changes, changes the court found to “demonstrate that
the tax credit has been modified to benefit low-income families.”124
The court highlighted two major aspects of amendments to the CTC,
making the refundable portion a public assistance benefit: (1) the addition of
the refundable portion of the CTC and (2) the reduction of the refundability
threshold from $10,000 to $3000.125 First, the court noted that while the
CTC, as first enacted, was limited to families with three or more children,
Congress eliminated the limit on the number of children and increased the
CTC from $500 per qualifying child to $600 in 2001.126 The court indicated
that while this amendment made the credit accessible to families with fewer
than three children, the real foundational change to the CTC came with Congress’s addition of the refundable ACTC.127 Second, the court emphasized
the amendments Congress made to the ACTC between 2005 and 2008, increasing the refundability percentage and lowering the refundability threshold
from $10,000 to $3000.128 The court noted that this change in particular allowed low-income taxpayers to claim a greater portion of the CTC as a refund.129
122. Id.
123. Id. The court looked specifically at the language in the legislative history of

the statute, which stated:
At its most basic, the original CTC statute allowed parents under a certain income threshold to claim a nonrefundable credit of $500 per qualifying child.
After MAGI meets that threshold—$55,000 married filing separately, $75,000
head of household, and $110,000 married filing jointly—the credit is reduced
by $50 per $1000 MAGI.

Id. (citing Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §101, 111 Stat. 788,
796–99).
124. Id. at 1194.
125. Id. at 1193–95 (citing Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 201, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47).
126. Id. at 1193 (Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 §
201). Congress also set up additional increases: 2001–2004 tax years: $600; 2005–
2008 tax years: $700; 2009 tax year: $800; and 2010 and after: $1000. Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 201.
127. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1193 (citing Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 201).
128. Id. at 1195 (citing American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, § 1003, 123 Stat. 115, 313 (2009)). Adjusted for inflation based on
2001 dollars. Id. at 1194.
129. This is particularly beneficial to low-income taxpayers who may have very
little tax liability. Before the refundable portion of the CTC became available, any
amount of the credit that low-income taxpayers could receive was limited to reducing
their tax liability. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §101, 111 Stat.
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The court reasoned that the only taxpayers who would receive the refundable portion of the ACTC would be low-income individuals, as higher
income taxpayers would not be eligible to receive a refund.130 The court also
relied on comments made by members of Congress and Presidents Bush and
Obama in passing the amendments to the CTC.131 The court cited Senator
Snowe, who sought to explain the legislation’s effect:
In its original form, the tax relief plan would not have reached all
fulltime workers—the tax reduction would have disappeared for
wageearners [sic] with net incomes of less than about $22,000. Indeed, without refundability, there are almost 16 million children
whose families would not benefit from the doubling of the Child Tax
Credit.132

The court also acknowledged Congress’s reduction of the threshold refund eligibility amount from $10,000 to $8500 in 2008 and then down to
$3000 in 2009.133 In fact, the court found the 2008 and 2009 amendments to
be particularly instructive regarding the legislative intent behind the CTC.134
The court stated, “These amendments substantially shifted the balance between providing incentives for taxpayers to earn income, on the one hand,
and simply providing benefits to the needy, on the other.”135
In summarizing the analysis of the legislative history and intent of the
CTC and ACTC, the court concluded, “the intent of the legislature when
788, 796–99. Therefore, if a taxpayer qualified for a $2000 CTC but only had $500
in actual tax liability, the taxpayer could only recognize $500 of the credit. See id.
130. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1194. The CTC begins to phase out at $55,000 for
married taxpayers filing separately; $75,000 for head of household taxpayers; and
$110,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 101.
However, even many taxpayers who are below these phase-out amounts do not receive the full credit amount as a refund because the majority of their credit would be
used to reduce tax liability. See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41873, THE CHILD TAX CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2
(2014).
131. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1194–95 (citing comments from Senators Boxer,
Snowe, Wellstone, and Baucus and statements made by President Bush and President
Obama). “The child credit expansion to low-income families is immediate. Over 16
million more children will be helped by the provisions of this bill.” Id. (quoting 147
CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001)) (statement of Sen. Charles “Chuck” Grassley). See
also 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statements of Sen. Paul Wellstone); 147
CONG. REC. S5028-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus); Remarks on Signing
the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. S27; Statement by
President Obama Upon Signing H.R. 4853, 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. S41.
132. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1194 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001)
(statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe)).
133. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1195.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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modifying the ACTC was to benefit low-income families. The ACTC has
fulfilled Congress’s goals. In practice, it appears to overwhelmingly benefit
low-income families.”136 The court also concluded that the inclusion of the
ACTC as a public assistance benefit was supported by a number of bankruptcy courts that have addressed the issue.137 Finally, the court acknowledged
that not all other courts have reached the same conclusion but opined that the
courts which drew the opposite conclusion had not adequately taken into account the many amendments to the CTC and the clear legislative intent behind the changes.138 The court ultimately concluded:
Here, the [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel] focused too narrowly on the
CTC as originally enacted. It is necessary to also consider the various
statutory amendments that modified the refundable portion of the
credit—the portion of the credit at issue in this case. These modifications demonstrate Congress intended to benefit the needy with the
ACTC. Accordingly, we find the ACTC meets the Missouri exemption requirement of a public assistance benefit. 139

The court found that the amendments to the original CTC that created a
refundable portion of the credit were intended to benefit the “needy.”140 The
court also found that public assistance benefits under Section
513.430.1(10)(a)141 consisted of those government benefits intended to be
provided to the “needy.”142 Therefore, the court concluded that the refundable portion of the CTC met the Missouri exemption requirement for a public
assistance benefit.143

V. COMMENT
Whether the Hardy decision was correctly decided depends on both the
policies underlying bankruptcy exemptions generally, as well as the purpose
and scope of the exemption for the public assistance benefits specifically.
This Part explores these interrelated questions in turn. The court in Hardy
accepted that public assistance benefits were exemptible from the bankruptcy
estate because they were listed in the Missouri exemption statute. But, in
order to fully evaluate whether the Hardy decision was correctly decided, a
frame of analysis is necessary to examine the purposes behind bankruptcy
exemptions generally. Policymakers agree that the primary purpose of bankruptcy exemptions is to provide debtors with the bare necessities of life fol136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a) (West 2016).
In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1197.
Id.
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lowing bankruptcy.144 Yet, there is a vigorous debate over exactly which
property should be exempt from the reach of creditors.145

A. The Purposes of Bankruptcy Exemption Statutes
Recall that debtors are generally entitled to choose between the federal
exemption scheme outlined in Section 522(d) of the bankruptcy code or the
exemptions of the state in which they reside.146 The bankruptcy statute also
allows each state to opt out of the federal exemption statute and instead requires debtors to use that state’s exemptions.147 Although Missouri has opted
out of the federal exemption statute,148 its exemptions are not significantly
different. In fact, both the federal statute and the Missouri exemption statute
have come to many of the same conclusions regarding the assets and property
that allow debtors to maintain a sufficient standard of living following bankruptcy.149 Missouri’s exemption scheme and the federal exemption scheme
have very similar language for the exemptions of public assistance benefits.150
Professor Alan Resnick, a leading bankruptcy scholar, has established a
nuanced framework for understanding the basic purposes of bankruptcy exemption laws:
1. To provide a debtor enough money to survive.
2. To protect his dignity and his cultural and religious identity.
3. To afford a means of financial rehabilitation.

144. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 169 (5th ed. 2006) (“The law of every state makes at least some property
exempt from execution and other legal process so that no debtor can be reduced to
absolute destitution.”).
145. See generally David Gray Carlson, The Role of Valuation in Federal Bankruptcy Exemption Process: The Supreme Court Reads Schedule C, 18 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 461 (2010); Heather M. Forrest, Are Bankruptcy-Specific State Exemptions Constitutional?, 31-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (2012); Timothy D. Moratzka,
Fresh Start, Head Start, or Running Start: Bankruptcy Exemption Planning, 22-APR
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (2003).
146. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
147. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (b)(2) (West 2016) (“Property listed in this paragraph is
property that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable
to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize.”).
148. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.427 (2000).
149. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.430 (West 2016); 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d).
150. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a) (“A Social Security benefit,
unemployment compensation or a public assistance benefit”), with 11 U.S.C.A. §
522(d)(10)(A) (“a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local
public assistance benefit”).
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4. To protect the family unit from impoverishment.
5. To spread the burden of the debtor’s support from society to his
creditors.151

Does the inclusion of public assistance benefits in bankruptcy exemption
statutes satisfy these five purposes laid out by Professor Resnick?
First, public assistance benefits, by definition, provide aid and assistance
to the public in need;152 therefore, under Professor Resnick’s framework,
public assistance benefits work to support debtors in providing some amount
of money for them to survive. Moreover, public assistance benefits allow
debtors to protect their cultural and religious identities by providing debtors
with revenue that allows them to maintain their cultural and religious memberships and community involvement, even during their bankruptcy.153
In addition, aid from public assistance benefits contributes to debtors’
rehabilitation after their bankruptcy, as public assistance benefits are cash
payments that, as exempt from the bankruptcy estate, debtors can use to pre151. In re Hahn, 5 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980) (citing Alan Resnick,
Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase
or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 621
(1978)). This framework has been cited by several sources, including: 2 Bankruptcy
Desk Guide § 13:11, Editor’s Comment (March 2016); Matter of Hahn, 5 B.R. 242, 2
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 761 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980); In re Ellingson, 63 B.R.
271, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶71281 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Honorable William
Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption Limitations: The
“Opt-Out” as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149
(1997); Georgianne L. Huckfeldt, Conversion of Nonexempt Assets to Exempt Assets
Prior to Bankruptcy—A Question of Fraud?, 56 MO. L. REV. 857 (1991); Matthew J.
Kemmer, Personal Bankruptcy Discharge and Myth of the Unchecked Homestead
Exemption, 56 MO. L. REV. 683 (1991).
152. A dictionary definition of “public assistance” is: “government aid to needy,
aged, or disabled persons and to dependent children.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (11th ed. 2012).
153. Professor Resnick illustrates the importance of protecting cultural and religious identities in bankruptcy, stating:
Most people have property which has significant sentimental value greatly
outweighing its monetary worth. If an item has important subjective value to
the debtor and would realize a relatively small amount of money on liquidation, respect for the item’s personal worth to the debtor should dictate that the
property be exempt from the creditor’s grasp.
This rationale justifies many of the exemption laws today, including those for
Bibles, family pictures, wedding rings and other jewelry, books, cemetery
plots, seats occupied in places of worship, and domestic pets. The importance
of these items is not their monetary value nor the physical survival of the
debtor; they relate instead to the cultural, religious, and moral aspects of life
which should be preserved despite the debtor’s financial hardship.

Resnick, supra note 151, at 623–24.
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vent new debts from arising. In a similar vein, because public assistance benefits are exempt, they provide money to debtors to prevent families from becoming impoverished. Finally, public assistance benefits provide debtors
with support that fulfills all four other purposes and, in doing so, limits the
burden on society by allowing debtors to maintain a sufficient standard of
living during bankruptcy and encourages financial independence postbankruptcy. Thus, it seems clear that public assistance benefits fit squarely
within the policy justifications underlying exemptions in bankruptcy generally.154

B. The Additional Child Tax Credit as a Public Assistance Benefit
The next step is to ascertain whether the court in Hardy correctly categorized the CTC as a public assistance benefit. Although the Hardy court
points out multiple definitions of a public assistance benefit, at its core, a
public assistance benefit is a program designed to help the “needy” survive at
a subsistence level.155 How does the CTC work to accomplish this goal?
Following the same framework Professor Resnick established to evaluate the purposes of exemptions in the bankruptcy code generally, the CTC
should fulfill the same five purposes in order to qualify as a public assistance
benefit exemption. First, a refundable tax credit would provide debtors with
an additional amount of money to sustain their family, albeit a fairly small
amount in some cases. Additionally, the ACTC is limited by income and by
the number of qualifying children that taxpayers have, making the credit even
smaller and less widely available. For example, Ms. Hardy’s refundable
ACTC was only $2000.156 This refund does not dramatically affect Ms. Hardy’s disposable income or markedly improve her ability to pay back her creditors. This small refund, if added to her bankruptcy estate, probably would
not appreciably change the payout to creditors; however, as exempt property,
this refund could make a huge difference to her family, given that Ms. Hardy’s family is living on a very small fixed income, now made more limited by
Ms. Hardy’s bankruptcy filing. The first and fourth purposes fit together in
this way: the purposes of exemption laws in allowing for a sufficient standard
of living and preventing impoverishment can be advanced simultaneously
with the exemption of the refundable ACTC and the allowance for such funds
to be used to support the family instead of debtors’ creditors.
Second, public assistance benefits are important to the purpose of protecting debtors’ dignity and identity. The CTC in particular was enacted to
promote family values and has been amended to support low-income families
154. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §11-603(3) (West 2016); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12-1001(g)(1) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8)(a) (West 2016); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a).
155. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015).
156. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 442 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189.
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because raising children is neither cheap nor easy.157 Allowing the ACTC to
be exempted in bankruptcy can provide parents small amounts of funds to
support and nurture their cultural and religious identity. Section 1325 of the
Code allows for the inclusion of charitable contributions in calculating debtors’ disposable income, so long as the contributions “meet the definition of
‘charitable contribution’ under section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or
charitable entity or organization . . . in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of
gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are
made.”158
Third, exemptions of retirement accounts, social security benefits, and
other public assistance benefits from the bankruptcy estate allow debtors a
means to rehabilitate their financial situation after the close of their bankruptcy proceedings. Public assistance benefits are particularly useful for the purpose of providing for financial rehabilitation because they can allow debtors
to maintain a sufficient standard of living during their bankruptcy without
incurring further debt or financial stress.
Finally, as Professor Resnick argues, “Assuming that exemptions are
necessary and effective in the financial rehabilitation of debtors, if state and
federal governments did not grant any exemptions, society would have to
support debtors in the form of welfare payments.”159 The ACTC is not a welfare program. Instead, it works as a bonus for working parents who are raising families and gives them an incentive to earn income and maintain a constant source of revenue to provide for their families. Resnick’s concerns
about reliance on welfare are not affected by allowing for the exemption of
the ACTC. For example, in Ms. Hardy’s situation, the $2000 ACTC that she
receives would not work to support her or her family for very long. Therefore, Ms. Hardy’s reliance on society is minimal and is in no way increased
by the exemption of the ACTC amount.

C. The Legislative Intent and Practical Application of the Child Tax
Credit
A major concern that many bankruptcy courts have expressed regarding
the ACTC as a public assistance benefit revolves around the credit’s accessibility to middle- and upper-income taxpayers.160 Because the phase-out

157. See 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe);
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 101–02, 118 Stat.
1166, 1167–68; Remarks on Signing the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004,
2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. S27; Statement by President Obama Upon Signing H.R. 4853,
2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. S41.
158. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West).
159. Resnick, supra note 151, at 626.
160. See In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 447; In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 725–26; In re
Dever, 250 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000); In re Law, 336 B.R. 780, 783 n.2
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006).
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threshold begins at fairly high-income rates,161 many courts have argued that
the CTC is not intended as a benefit for just low-income taxpayers.162 However, taxpayers with incomes reaching the phase-out threshold would likely
use the CTC to offset tax liability and would not actually have any refundable
portion.163 For such taxpayers, using the CTC to offset tax liability would not
be a public assistance benefit. The nonrefundable credit under the original
legislative intent was to provide a tax break for families to promote family
values.164
There is no question that the nonrefundable CTC is not a public assistance benefit itself. However, the refundable ACTC is different. The ACTC
was adopted as a refundable portion of the CTC, but it was clearly adopted
under a different legislative intent. The ACTC is entirely based on the taxpayers’ incomes and works to provide a refund for taxpayers with limited tax
liability.165 The amendments alone do not necessarily indicate the evolution
of the CTC into a public assistance benefit. However, it does indicate that as
Congress has amended the CTC, adding a refundable portion to the CTC and
allowing for the CTC to be “available to all families with qualifying children,”166 the legislative intent behind this credit has evolved to be “a key to
helping children in low-income families.”167
The aspect of the CTC that more readily lends itself to fitting within the
realm of a public assistance benefit is the “refundability threshold.”168 As
amended, the threshold for the refundable portion of the CTC begins at $3000
161. See supra note 88. The threshold income amounts are: $55,000 for married
filing separately; $75,000 for head of household; and $110,000 for married filing
jointly. I.R.C. § 24(b)(2) (West 2016). This threshold is the point in a taxpayer’s
income where the credit begins to be scaled down – $50 for every $1000 above the
threshold amount. Id.
162. See In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 726 (quoting In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 528
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003)) (“‘Rarely will a middle or an upper-income level taxpayer
receive a refund of the child tax credit.’ However, ‘rarely’ is not the same as ‘never,’
and the court did not explain how the record before it supported this conclusion.”).
163. See generally CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 130.
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 310 (1997).
165. Senator Snowe explained the purpose of the ACTC as:
In its original form, the tax relief plan would not have reached all fulltime
workers—the tax reduction would have disappeared for wage-earners with net
incomes of less than about $22,000. Indeed, without refundability, there are
almost 16 million children whose families would not benefit from the doubling of the Child Tax Credit.

147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe).
166. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
211, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47).
167. 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).
168. CRANDALL-HOLLICK supra note 130, at 1.
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of earned income.169 Additionally, the refundability rate of fifteen percent
means that “[f]or every dollar of earnings above [the $3000 refundability
threshold], the value of the taxpayer’s ACTC increases by 15 cents, up to the
maximum amount.”170 This means the minimum income required to start
receiving an ACTC credit is $3001 per year. The court in Hardy found these
amendments in 2008 and 2009 to be the defining moment when the CTC
became a public assistance benefit, highlighting the shift in balance between
providing incentives to taxpayers, as the CTC was originally enacted, and
providing benefits to the needy, made possible through the enactment of the
refundable ACTC.171
Therefore, the ACTC overwhelmingly works to fulfill the five purposes
of exemption laws as Professor Resnick lays them out. As such, its exemption from the bankruptcy estate for Ms. Hardy, and many other debtors in
bankruptcy, does more good for people than it can do as part of the bankruptcy estate. The ACTC, as currently enacted, works much like the EITC,
providing tax refunds based on earned income rather than simply as an incentive for having a family.172
While the court in Hardy appears to have reached the correct decision,
this decision alone does not go far enough to help debtors or to clarify the
ambiguous language of the statutes for courts. Because the Eighth Circuit is
the first appellate court to address this issue, there is still a large split of authority among the lower courts.173 As such, the controlling statutes need to be
amended and clarified because there is no indication that other courts will
follow the Hardy ruling in the future.174 This Note proposes an amendment
to the Missouri exemption statute with the intent to clarify Missouri’s exemption scheme and with the hope that it can be seen as a template for other similarly ambiguous state and federal exemption statutes.
Section
513.430.1(10)(a) should be amended as follows:
(10) Such person’s right to receive:
(a) A Social Security benefit, unemployment compensation or a public
assistance benefit, including but not limited to:
(i) The refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit (additional
Child Tax Credit) as found in I.R.C. §24;
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 4.
In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1193.
Id.
See supra Part III.C.
Uniformity in state exemption statutes would resolve some of the ambiguity
and inconsistencies in the lower courts. For an analysis of the need for uniformity in
bankruptcy legislation, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on StateEnacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 361 (2014).
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(ii) The Earned Income Tax Credit as found in I.R.C. §32; and
(iii) The Adoption Tax Credit as found in I.R.C. §23.

As amended, this statute would provide clearer boundaries for the definition of public assistance benefits and will provide guidance to future courts
and debtors in bankruptcy cases. The addition of “including but not limited
to” provides for the possibility of additional public assistance benefits to fit
within the statute, while also preventing further confusion in interpreting and
defining such terms of art as public assistance benefits. Finally, this amendment would serve as a template for other ambiguous exemption statutes
across the country in preventing misuse or continued ambiguous interpretation of statutory language that can so directly and drastically affect debtors’
lives during their bankruptcy.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit was correct in its decision that the ACTC qualifies as
a public assistance benefit for the purposes of Missouri’s exemption scheme
in bankruptcy filings. However, the Eighth Circuit is the first appellate court
to set a precedent allowing the ACTC to be exempted from a bankruptcy estate under the public assistance benefits exemption. The court’s holding does
not resolve the uncertainty revolving around the definition of public assistance benefits in exemption statutes across the country.
This Note attempts to clarify the definition by providing an amendment
to the Missouri statute consistent with the purposes underlying bankruptcy
exemptions. One goal of this Note is to encourage other states, as well as
Congress, to make similar amendments to their exemption statutes so that
already overburdened courts have one less issue to wade through in dealing
with bankruptcy cases. Even while bankruptcy-filing rates are finally beginning to drop, there are still large portions of the population filing for bankruptcy each year. Bankruptcy exemption statutes seek to strike the balance
between holding debtors accountable for their outstanding debts and providing relief from extensive and crippling debt. The exemption of public assistance benefits can make a huge difference for low-income debtors who qualify for such benefits, even in small sums like in the ACTC, without undermining the balanced intent of the bankruptcy code.
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